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With increasing numbers of organizations automating
their business processes by using workflow systems,
security aspects of workflow systems has become a
heavily researched area. Also, most workflow processes
nowadays need to be adaptive, i.e., constantly chang-
ing, to meet changing business conditions. However,
little attention has been paid to integrating Security and
Adaptive Workflow. In this paper, we investigate this
important research topic, with emphasis on Role-Based
Access Control  RBAC in Adaptive Workflow. Based
on our earlier work on a 3-tier adaptive workflow archi-
tecture, we present the design of a similar 3-tier RBAC
infrastructure, and we show that it conceptually mirrors
our adaptive workflow architecture. We also describe the
mappings between them, and we show how this mapping
can be used to manage organizational RBAC constraints
when the workflows are being adapted continuously. We
illustrate our ideas throughout the paper with a simple
yet non-trivial example.
Keywords: security, role based access control, adaptive
workflow.
1. Introduction
Increasing numbers of organizations are au-
tomating their business processes by installing
and using workflow systems. This has raised
several research issues regarding security as-
pects of these workflow systems. Hence Se-
cure Workflow has become a fertile research
area  Atluri, et.al., 2000; Bertino, et.al., 1999;
Cholewka, et.al,. 2000; Nyanchama and Os-
born, 1999. However, most workflow pro-
cesses nowadays need to be adaptive, i.e. con-
stantly changing, to meet changing business
conditions. In this paper, we address this impor-
tant topic, with emphasis on Role-Based Access
Control RBAC. Based on our earlier work on
a 3-tier adaptive workflow architecture Naren-
dra, 2000, we define a similar 3-tier RBAC in-
frastructure that mirrors our adaptive workflow
architecture. We also describe the mappings be-
tween them, and we show how this mapping can
be used to manage organizational RBAC con-
straints when the workflows are being adapted
continuously. In fact, we believe that ours is the
first attempt at integrating Security and Adap-
tive Workflow.
This paper is organized as follows. In the next
Section, we provide an introduction to Work-
flow and Adaptive Workflow, where we present
our 3-tier adaptive workflow architecture. In
Section 3, we present the latest research re-
sults in Secure Workflow on which our work
is based. The main result of this paper, i.e.,
our 3-tier RBAC infrastructure, is presented in
Section 4. Section 5 concludes the paper with
directions for future research. We also illustrate
our ideas throughout the paper using, a simple
yet non-trivial example.
2. Workflow Preliminaries
2.1. Introduction to Workflow
Our basic workflow model is based on the
graph-theoretic notions in the OpenPM Shan,
et.al., 1997 process model. We assume that
each workflow instance is a directed graph W
  N,E, where N is the set of nodes and E
is the set of edges. Each edge e in E is a tuple
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of the form   nbegin, nend , where the edge is
directed from nbegin to nend.
We first define two unique nodes — START
and END nodes; for each workflow, there will
be only one of each kind. A START node has no
predecessor, and an END node has no successor.
The workflow graph is assumed to obey two
simple conditions:
  Every node in the graph is reachable from
the START node, i.e., there is a path from the
START node to every other node in the graph
  The END node is reachable from every node
in the graph, i.e., there is a path from the node
to the END node
Nodes are of two kinds — work nodes and route
nodes. Work nodes are nodes that actually per-
form the activities in the workflow. Route nodes
are nodes whose only function is to evaluate
rules i.e., boolean conditions and, depending
on the result of the evaluation, these nodes di-
rect the flow of control to specific work nodes
or route nodes.
For each work node, we assume the existence
of specific data structures that capture the data
flow information with the node. In other words,
each work node is assumed to perform certain
operations on data and artifacts e.g., complete
a form, collate and summarize data, etc.. These
operations, together with the data flow, define
the flow of control throughout the workflow;
and this is a consequence of the workflow de-
sign.
In our workflow model, edges are of four kinds
— forward edge, loop edge, soft-sync edge and
strict-sync edge. Forward edges depict the nor-
mal workflow execution, which is in a forward
direction. Loop edges are backward pointing
edges that are used to depict the repeated exe-
cution of loops.
The “sync” edges are quite different from for-




















Fig. 1. Workflow Graph.
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support synchronizations of tasks from differ-
ent parallel branches of a loop. There are two
types:
  A “soft-sync” edge from n1 to n2 is used to
signify a “delay dependency” between n1 and
n2, i.e., n2 can only be executed if n1 is ei-
ther completed or cannot be triggered any more.
This type of synchronization does not require
successful completion of n1.
  A “strict-sync” edge from n1 to n2 requires
that n1 successfully complete before n2 exe-
cutes.
Clearly, the use of such edges must satisfy some
conditions:
  Redundant control flow dependencies be-
tween nodes and loops should be avoided
  A sync edge may not connect a node from
inside a loop body with a node not contained
within that loop
An example of workflow graph that illustrates
all these definitions, is shown in Figure 1. The
arcs depict the flow of the data and artifacts
from the START to the END node.
We can also define states for each node, de-
pending on where it is during the workflow ex-
ecution. Hence we define the following states
for nodes: NOT-ACTIVATED, ACTIVATED,
DONE, FAILED, SUSPENDED.
The definition of these states naturally leads to
the conclusion that we can define the state tran-
sition diagram that each node has to obey. In-
deed, this means that the state of every node in
the workflow instance is governed by the tran-
sition rules in the state transition diagram. This


















Fig. 2. State Transition Diagram.
2.2. Adaptive Workflow
In Narendra, 2000, we developed a 3-tier ap-
proach to adaptive workflow management. Es-
sentially, we recognized that a workflow needs
to have a schema, i.e., a basic definition of its
structure before it can be instantiated and ex-
ecuted. Moreover, since workflow is typically
executed in business organizations, it is essen-
tial that it meet certain business goals. There-
fore we see that business goals essentially aris-
ing out of planning lead to workflow schema
being defined, out of which a workflow in-
stance is generated for execution.
Hence we see that workflow adaptivity is basi-
cally of three types:
  Adaptivity at instance level: here, only the
workflow instances need to be modified, per-
haps to make them more efficient, or to make
them easier to execute, etc. The modules that
implement this are:
 Basic Workflow Model — stores the instances
of our workflow model
 Workflow Change Model — stores the con-
structs for specifying dynamic workflow
changes
 Workflow Change Verifier — performs the
syntactic and semantic checking for work-
flow adaptation
 Workflow–Schema Interface Manager — in-
terface module that interacts with the Schema
Layer
  Adaptivity at schema level: here, the work-
flow schema will need to be modified – this
would arise if certain “ways of doing things”
change, and will necessitate radical modifica-
tions to all the workflow instances of the schema
in question. The modules that implement this
are:
 Schema Handler — creates, versions and
stores the workflow schema
 Schema Migration Manager — handles mi-
gration of workflow instances between sche-
mas, and interfaces with the Schema Handler
 Schema-Planning Interface Manager — in-
terface module that interacts with the Plan-
ning Layer
  Adaptivity at planning/goal level: here,
the goals may themselves have to be modified
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in response to changing environmental condi-
tions – this could cause radical changes in the
schema themselves, which could cause disrup-
tive changes in the workflow instances. The
modules that implement this are:
 Organizational Workflow Repository — or-
ganization-wide repository of all workflow
processes stored into the system; stores the
workflow schemas and their instances, and
also stores the goals that led to the creation
of the workflow in the first place.
 Goal Specification Module — through this
module, the workflow designer first enters
the goals that the workflow has to satisfy.
Heshe can then look into the Organiza-
tional Workflow Repository, for reusing any
workflows from the past that can satisfy —
either fully or partially — the goals that
heshe has specified.
 Workflow Design Module — with this mod-
ule, and with the goal and workflow informa-
tion from the Goal Specification Module and
the Organizational Workflow Repository, the
workflow designer can design the workflow
schema. Heshe will then check it into the
Organizational Workflow Repository. The
schema will be transferred into the Schema
Handler via the Schema-Plannng Interface
Manager where it will be appropriately ver-
sioned and stored. The appropriate version
number is then communicated to the user.
The architecture is pictorially depicted in Figure
3.





























Fig. 3. Three-Tier Adaptive Workflow Architecture.
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3. Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) in
Workflow
3.1. Preliminaries
The most well-known approach towards secu-
rity administration has been the Role-Based
Access Control RBAC model Sandhu and
Samarati, 1994. This model allocates access
rights to users based on the Roles that they per-
form in the organization; these access rights are
also called “privileges”. Roles can also be orga-
nized in a hierarchy — typically a partial order.
In this hierarchy, Roles at higher levels are as-
sumed to “inherit” the access rights of Roles at
lower levels in the hierarchy, in addition to the
access rights that they already possess.
In addition to this hierarchy, constraints can
also be defined on how these access rights are
granted to particular Roles. Some of the most
common constraints are Separation of Duty con-
straints, of which there are two types:
  Static Separation of Duty (SSOD) — these
constraints impose static restrictions such as
“the role R cannot have access rights A1 and
A2 simultaneously”
  Dynamic Separation of Duty (DSOD) —
these constraints impose dynamic restrictions
such as “if role R1 has executed task T1, then
R1 cannot execute task T2”
In other words, SSOD constraints can be eval-
uated without executing the workflow, whereas
DSOD constraints evaluation can only be per-
formed at run time.
Hence in Sandhu and Samarati, 1994, the
RBAC model has itself been modeled as a par-
tial order lattice depicted in Figure 4:
 RBAC0 — the basic RBAC model
 RBAC1 — RBAC0 with role hierarchies
 RBAC2 — RBAC0 with constraints
 RBAC3 — combination of all of the above
An RBAC3-compliant version of RBAC has
been presented in Nyanchama and Osborn,
1999, which also presents a 3-tier RBAC model,
consisting of User-Group assignments, User-
Role assignments and Role-Privilege assign-





Fig. 4. RBAC Lattice.
  The notion of “direct” privileges privileges
that are owned solely by the Role and “inher-
ited” privileges privileges owned by Roles that
are junior to the Role in question
  Algorithms for Role management, i.e., Role
addition & Role deletion, and additiondeletion
modification of privileges associated with a
Role
  The ideas of the conflicts that may arise in
this model and how they are handled:
 Role-role conflicts — assigning two conflict-
ing Roles to a user
 Privilege-privilege conflicts — assigning two
conflicting privileges to a Role
 User-role assignment conflicts — assigning
a Role to a user who is not allowed to play
that role
 Role-privilege assignment conflicts — as-
signing a privilege to the Role which is not
allowed to access that privilege
A sample Role Graph is presented in Figure
5. For the sake of completeness, every Role
Graph has two optional “dummy” roles, Max-
Role and MinRole, that are the senior and ju-
nior, respectively, of all Roles. Numbers next to
each role are the direct privileges of that Role.
For example: for VP1, the direct privileges
are f9,10g, whereas the inherited privileges are
f1,2,3,4,5,6g, which consist of the direct privi-
leges of all Roles reporting directly or indirectly
to VP1.






L4 {7,8}L3 {5,6}L2 {4,5}L1 {3,4}
VP2{11}VP1 {9,10}
MaxRole
Fig. 5. Role Graph.
The following algorithms for Role management
have been provided in Nyanchama and Osborn,
1999:
  Role Addition with only direct privileges —
a Role is added to the Role Graph along with its
direct privileges only
  Role Addition with inherited privileges — a
Role is added to the Role Graph along with its
direct and inherited privileges
  Role Deletion — a Role is deleted from the
Role Graph; this would also involve either dele-
tion or re-allocation of the direct privileges as-
sociated with the Role
  Privilege Addition — a privilege is added to
a Role
  Privilege Deletion — a privilege is deleted
from a Role
  Edge Insertion — a new reporting relation-
ship between a Role and one of its Senior Roles
is added
  Edge Deletion — a reporting relationship
between a Role and one of its Senior Roles is
deleted.
All Addition algorithms also contain steps for
checking for the 4 types of conflicts described
above, and will abort with an error message
in case a conflict is detected. The algorithms
also incorporate mechanisms for detecting cy-
cles in the Role Graph, in which case they will
abort with an error message. For details, please
see the original paper Nyanchama and Osborn,
1999.
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Please note that “negative authorizations” for
example, as specified in Damianou, et.al., 2001,
viz., that a Role cannot access a particular priv-
ilege, are implicitly incorporated into the Role
Graph by simply ensuring that the privilege in
question does not appear along with the Role
in the Role Graph. In other words, by default,
a Role has only negative authorizations, unless
and until any particular privileges are assigned
to it.
The real-life applicability of the RBAC model
has been validated in a real-life case study of
a large European bank, which is presented in
Schaad, et.al., 2001.
In Thomas and Sandhu, 1997, an RBAC-
based model for workflow called Task-Based
Authorization Control TBAC is presented.
This model specifies, in a manner similar to that
of RBAC, the tasks that each role is authorized
to perform. A lattice structure similar to that
of RBAC, i.e., TBAC0 through TBAC3 is also
presented. This is taken further in Cholewka,
et.al., 2000, where a mapping between RBAC
and a similar TBAC-like model are presented.
In essence, TBAC works by setting users’ ac-
cess rights either at workflow definition time, or
at workflow execution time before the workflow
task is executed.
A similar model is presented in Huand and
Atluri, 1999. In this model, a Workflow Au-
thorization Template is attached to each task in
the workflow. This template grants appropriate
authorizations only when the task starts and re-
vokes it once the tasks has finished. More than
one Template can be assigned to a task in case
more than one user needs to execute the task.
The area of Multilevel Secure MLS Work-
flows is an offshoot of Secure Workflow, and
is concerned with modeling workflows when
different tasks in the workflow are at different
security levels. More details can be found from
 Atluri, et.al., 2000; Kang, et.al., 1999; how-
ever, MLS workflows are out of the scope of
this paper.
In this paper, we assume the existence of a sin-
gle Workflow Administrator who has the abil-
ity and the authority to defineadapt and deploy
the workflows on the workflow system. This
would, of course, raise the issue of having a hi-
erarchy of workflow administrators, each with
privileges over certain workflows Sandhu and
Munawer, 1997; however, this issue is out of
the scope of this paper.
A very good overall introduction to security is-
sues in workflow can be obtained from Atluri,
2002.
Recently, the RBAC model has been extended to
include dynamic aspects, i.e., Temporal RBAC
Bertino and Bonatti, 2001. This model sup-
ports periodic enabling and disabling of roles,
possibly with individual exceptions for particu-
lar users.
3.2. Authorization Model for Secure
Workflows
A comprehensive authorization model for sup-
porting specification and enforcement of autho-
rization constraints in workflows has been pre-
sented in Bertino, et.al., 1999. Briefly, the
model specifies a constraint specification lan-
guage through which the workflow designer can
specify, which roles and users are obliged or de-
nied access to the workflow tasks, in the form of
static specified at definition time and dynamic
specified at run time constraints. These con-
straints can also include the DSOD and SSOD
constraints as defined in Section 3.1.
This model provides for both positive and nega-
tive authorizations for roles resp. users, which
are referred to as “Obliged Roles resp. Users”
and “Denied Roles resp. Users”. The con-
straint specification results in the creation of a
Constraint Base, whose consistency is checked
for ensuring that the roles and users belong-
ing to the “Obliged” category to execute a task,
if any, do not belong to the set of roles and
users belonging to the “Denied” category for
that task, and vice versa.
Hence the model proposes an algorithm for
user-task allocation, whose inputs are the fol-
lowing:
  The Global SSOD & DSOD Security Con-
straints are represented in the Constraint Base
CB
  The User-Role Mapping
  The Role Graph as described in Section 3.1,
which depicts the Role-Task Assignment
  The output of the algorithm is the user-task
allocation for the workflow, which will be the
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input to our algorithm to be described in Section
4.4.
For our purposes, we redefine the “Obliged
Roles resp. Users” as “Authorized Roles
resp. Users”, where Authorized essentially
refers to the direct privileges for tasks the Role
resp. user can access. Hence we redefine
“Denied Roles resp. Users” as those that
do not belong to the “Authorized Roles resp.
Users” set.
In this section, we have only briefly introduced
the algorithm; for more details, please refer to
the original paper Bertino, et.al., 1999. We
have also not described the SSOD and DSOD
constraints more formally here, since they are
already described in Bertino, et.al., 1999;
moreover, our emphasis is on the 3-tier RBAC
infrastructure itself.
4. Our Approach to RBAC in Adaptive
Workflow
Major motivation behind our approach is to try
to answer the following question: given our
3-tier adaptive workflow architecture, what is
the appropriate RBAC infrastructure that would
“mirror” our adaptive workflow architecture?
In other words, for each level of adaptivity-
instance, schema, planning — what would be
the appropriate RBAC-related modifications to
make?
To answer this question, we revisit the 3-tier
model of Nyanchama and Osborn, 1999 de-
scribed in Section 3.1. We recast this model as
the following 3-tier RBAC model:
  Global SSOD & DSOD Constraints
  User-Role Assignment
  Role-Task Assignment
This model maps naturally onto our 3-tier adap-
tive workflow architecture:
  When business goals are set for workflow
processes, the task of planning and scheduling
these processes should take into account the
global SSOD & DSOD constraints while the
workflow schema is being defined
  For workflow schema definition, the most
crucial RBAC-related action that needs to be
performed, is to assign the appropriate roles to
the users in the organization. This assignment
is also based on an understanding of the overall
business goals of the organization, and also on
the kinds of tasks that each role would need to
execute.
  Hence, actual role-task assignment is done
at the time of workflow instance definition, i.e.,
when instances are created out of the schemas.
This is similar in approach to the TBAC model
as described in Thomas and Sandhu, 1997 and
introduced in Section 3.1.
Hence, depending on the nature of the adapta-
tion, the appropriate RBAC-related assignments
may need to be modified in order to ensure that
the modified workflow process can be executed
with the users available:
  For changes at instance level, only role-task
assignments may need to be modified, in order
to ensure that all tasks in the modified work-
flow instance can be performed. For example,
junior managers can be temporarily provided
with permission to approve certain purchases
if the change in the workflow instance results
in the non-availability of a senior manager to
perform the approval task.
  For changes at schema level, one of the two
types of changes can be made:
 User-role assignments may need to be mod-
ified instead of mere role-task assignment
changes. For example, a particular set of
individuals may be assigned the senior man-
ager role, so that they can permanently
approve the purchases. This modification
could also affect the role-task assignments,
which may also need to be changed to reflect
the changed user-role assignments.
 Global SSOD & DSOD constraints may need
to be modified.
The reason why user-role assignments have
been mapped to the workflow schema level is
that user-role assignments are typically more
radical and far-reaching than role-task assign-
ments in most organizations. For example, pro-
moting a junior manager to the senior manager
role means that heshe automatically has access
rights to all the tasks that the senior manager can
perform in all future workflow instances deriv-
ing from the adapted workflow schema. On the
other hand, temporarily providing himher with
some of the senior manager privileges for only
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a particular workflow instance, has much less
impact on the organization.
The case is similar for SSOD & DSOD con-
straint modification. If either of the above two
types of changes is made, then the impact on
the organization will be far greater than merely
changing role-task assignments.
  For changes of business goals resulting in
widespread workflow schema changes, the glo-
bal SSOD & DSOD constraints may also need
to be modified, in addition to modifying the
user-role assignments. That is, these two types
of changes are far more disruptive than either
one of them acting alone. This is because,
as explained above, global constraints typically
define the very basic constraints under which
the organization functions; changing these con-
straints could lead to major changes in the or-
ganization structure itself.
One example of change in a global constraint
is that approval for certain purchases below a
certain amount may no longer be required. Al-
ternatively, an additional SSOD constraint may
be introduced that restricts a person from being
a junior manager and also from being granted
permission to approve purchases above a certain
limit. Such changes in constraints could also af-
fect the user-role assignments, which could, in
turn, affect the role-task assignments.
Of course, our model may be an over-simplifica-
tion in many cases, but it provides one way to
effectively manage RBAC-related inconsisten-
cies that could arise due to workflow changes.
The example to be introduced later in this Sec-
tion will illustrate these concepts and show the
efficacy of our model.
4.1. Modified Adaptive Workflow
Architecture
Based on the above mapping, the Planning
Layer of our 3-tier adaptive workflow architec-
ture depicted in Figure 3 is modified as shown
in Figure 6.
Since global SSOD & DSOD constraints are es-
sentially limitations on how the workflow will
meet the user-specified goals, they are derived
from the goals via the Goal Specification Mod-
ule, and are specified in the Security Mod-
ule. In this module, the Global Constraints













Fig. 6. Modified Planning Layer of Adaptive Workflow Architecture.
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are specified in the Global Constraint Specifica-
tion Module, which will also contain a consis-
tency checker for ensuring consistency among
the constraints. This will also involve setting
the User-Role and Role-Task assignments.
4.2. Our Example
We select a simple yet non-trivial example of
housing loan approvals at a bank this is a sim-
plified version of the process that the author
himself had to go through while obtaining a
housing loan at an Indian bank. We assume
the existence of the following roles in the Hous-
ing Loans department: Department Manager,
Junior Managers, and Clerks. The initially fol-
lowed workflow for housing loan approval is
shown in Figure 7.
Please note that in the original workflow, route
nodes need to exist after work nodes #1, #3, #4
and #5, to allow for the possibility of the cus-
tomer’s application being found unsuitable at
each of these nodes. For clarity, however, these
have been elided from the diagram.
Please also note that the task #5 has been intro-
duced since, as per regulations at most Indian
banks, a portion of the house must already have
been constructed before a housing loan can be
granted. This is to ensure that the loan amount
will be used only for the intended purpose, i.e.,
house building.
This workflow is then adapted in order to pro-
duce the following workflow as depicted in Fig-
ure 8.
Hence we see that the main adaptations are:
A Junior Manager’s initial approval is addition-
ally required, before additional processing can
be done on the loan application.
The document examination and assessor’s eval-
uation tasks are parallelized for efficiency; there
is also a strict-sync edge from task #5 to task
#4, signifying that House Assessment should be
completed successfully before Documents Ex-
amination is executed.
The Role Graph for the Housing Loans Depart-
ment is depicted in Figure 9 the numbers next
to each role are the tasks of the workflows of
Figures 7 and 8 the role is allowed to execute,
they are the privileges for the role.
One DSOD constraint in the Department is that
the Clerk who has processed the customer’s ap-
plication, i.e,. tasks #1, #2 and #3 cannot
approve the documents or perform house as-
sessment for the same customer i.e., tasks #3a,
#4 or #5. This constraint restricts the choice
of who will perform tasks #3a, #4 and #5 in
the event of a workflow adaptation if no Junior
Manager or Department Manager is available.
Fig. 7. Initially Followed Housing Loan Approval Workflow.
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1 {3a, 4, 5, 7}
Junior
Manager
3 {3a, 4, 5, 7}
Clerk 1 {1, 2, 3} Clerk 2 {1, 2, 3} Clerk 3 {1, 2, 3} Clerk 4 {1, 2, 3}
Junior
Manager
2 {3a, 4, 5, 7}
Fig. 9. Role Graph for Housing Loans Department.
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4.3. Modification Regions for Workflow
Changes




When a task is deleted, if the tasks following
this task are not changed in any way, then there
is no impact on the rest of the workflow. How-
ever, if the succeeding tasks in the workflow
are “brought forward” in order to take advan-
tage of the task deletion, then all these tasks are
potentially affected by this workflow change.
Tasks can be added in one of the following two
ways:
  In parallel — this would mostly affect other
tasks only if the user who is supposed to work
on this new task is also needed for other tasks
in the rest of the workflow.
  Sequentially — all succeeding tasks are po-
tentially affected by this new task.
In any case, determining the tasks affected by
the workflow change, which we call Modifica-
tion Region (MR), is a heuristic procedure that
needs to be implemented by the user based on
the semantics of the workflow. Moreover, as al-
ready mentioned in Section 3.1, we have already
assumed that the Workflow Administrator has
the ability to understand the workflow seman-
tics so that heshe can identify the Modification
Region for each workflow adaptation.
The MR is therefore the only part of the work-
flow that needs to be rescheduled due to work-
flow adaptation. In order to determine the MR,
the Workflow Administrator can take advantage
of the following features of our workflow model
see Section 2.1:
  Sync edges — tasks that are connected even
transitively by soft or strict sync edges to the
task being added or deleted, need to belong to
the MR. Hence all other workflow tasks that
are successors of the sync edge-connected task,
also need to be evaluated as potential candidates
to be included in the MR.
  State Transitions — all tasks that do not
belong to either DONE or FAILED state are
potential candidates to be included in the MR.
  Loops — all tasks belonging to the same
loop as the task being added or deleted, also
need to be considered as candidates for inclu-
sion in the MR.
Hence, in our example, the tasks #4, #5, #6 and
#7 form the MR, since they follow the added
task #3a. Since tasks #1, #2 and #3 are already
completed, they are in DONE state. Hence they
do not belong to the MR.
4.4. Re-assigning Roles and Users to a
Task
We assume the existence of the following:
  Role Graph as described in Section 3.1
  User-Role mapping, which maps users to
the roles they perform on the Role Graph ac-
cording to the algorithm of Section 3.2
As per the previous sub-section, when a task is
either added or deleted, all tasks in the MR have
to be rescheduled. Hence for each task in the
MR, we need to do the following:
  Determine whether there are users possess-
ing the roles assigned to the task by invoking
the algorithm of Section 3.2, who are available
to execute the task. If so, the user is allocated
to the task.
  If not, we adopt the following approach:
 Let the role assigned to the task as per the
Role Graph be R. We first search among the
seniors of R, in increasing order of senior-
ity in the Role Graph, as to whether any of
them are available to execute this task via
inherited privileges. The search stops once
a senior is found who is available to execute
the task.
 If not, then we check among the juniors of
each of the already checked seniors of the
user in question. This continues recur-
sively upwards in the Role Graph, starting
at each of the seniors of the user in ques-
tion, until the MaxRole role is reached.
Of course, at any time, the search ends if
an available user is found.
  If not, we search among the juniors of R, in
decreasing order of seniority in the Role Graph.
This is basically a “mirror image” of the search
among the seniors, thus: at each junior, the se-
niors of the junior are also checked, and this also
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proceeds recursively down the Role Graph, until
the MinRole role is reached. Again, the search
stops once a junior is found who is available to
execute the task.
In case the role of the available user cannot
execute the task as per the current Role-Task
assignments, then the user needs to be tem-
porarily allocated the privilege, so that heshe
can execute the task. If this allocation becomes
permanent, then the workflow change will be a
schema-level change.
Please note that at each candidate role in both
senior and junior searches, we also need to en-
sure that the Global SSOD & DSOD Constraints
are obeyed. Otherwise, we move on to the next
role and alert the workflow administrator as to
the exact violations that would occur.
  If neither search produces a satisfactory re-
sult, the workflow administrator will have to
take a decision manually. Alternatively, heshe
can relaxremove some of the Global SSOD
& DSOD Constraints so that some user can be
found to execute the task.
In our example, the task #3a is added, while
tasks #4 and #5 are parallelized, along with a
strict-sync edge between them. In case a Junior
Manager is not available to execute task #3a,
then the above algorithm needs to be invoked in
order to find out whether any other Junior Man-
ager or the Department Manager is available for
this task.
If not, then any available Clerk needs to be tem-
porarily given the privilege of executing task
#3a. In this case, if the clerk in question hap-
pens to be the one who processed the customer’s
application, then the DSOD constraint operat-
ing on this Clerk has to be removed to allow the
Clerk to execute this task.
In case of a workflow schema change, this tem-
porary privilege addition will become perma-
nent. In other words, even Clerks will have the
ability to perform initial approval, documents
examination and house assessment for all fu-
ture workflow instances and, in essence, they
will become the equals in rank to Junior Man-
ager. If, in addition, the constraint removal is
also made permanent, then this will become a
planning level change.
At first glance, such a re-assignment may seem
to be rather unusual and may even appear detri-
mental to the security of an organization. How-
ever, temporary delegation of a task to a junior
employee due to the absence of a senior em-
ployee is a common practice in most organiza-
tions.
The algorithm will then have to be implemented
for the other tasks in the MR, viz., #4, #5, #6
and #7.
The overall algorithm is given in Fig. 10.
5. Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper, we have presented our approach to
enforcing Role-Based Access Control RBAC
in Adaptive Workflow. In line with our earlier
work on a 3-tier adaptive workflow architec-
ture, we have presented a 3-tier RBAC infras-
tructure for adaptive workflow, consisting of
Global Constraints, User-Role Assignments and
Role-Task Assignment Layers; this mirrors our
adaptive workflow architecture, which consists
of Planning, Schema and Instance layers, re-
spectively. We have shown that temporary User
and Role allocation changes are sufficient for
instance level changes. Schema level changes
demand that these allocation changes be made
permanent, so that all future workflow instances
deriving from the new workflow schema are af-
fected by the newly changed allocations. In ad-
dition, Planning level changes require changes
in the Global Constraints that define how the
business operates itself.
We have also presented an incremental algo-
rithm, leveraging off prior research in Role
Based Access Control and Secure Workflow.
With this algorithm, it is possible to imple-
ment re-allocations in the presence of workflow
changes. The re-allocations need to be imple-
mented only for those portions of the workflow
also known as Modification Regions affected
by the workflow change. Indeed, we believe
that this is the first attempt at defining an RBAC
model and infrastructure for adaptive workflow.
There are several opportunities for future work.
Firstly, our RBAC model needs to be specified
in more detail, so that it can be implemented and
experimentally tested. In particular, safety and
correctness algorithms Mathews, 2001 need
to be incorporated into the model. Moreover,
a formal definition of our workflow language
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BEGIN
Assume an initial allocation of users and roles to tasks in the workflow as per the algorithm
of Section 3.2. Also assume that a workflow change has been introduced.
Determine MR  fAffected Tasksg as in Section 4.3;
for each Task in MR do
f
MR MRn fTaskg;  The Task is removed from the set of Affected Tasks  
IF the Task CAN be executed by the currently allocated user
then
f





S: Implement Re-Assignment Algorithm from Section 4.4;
if the Re-Assignment Algorithm is successful
then
f
Assign the user and the role to the task as per the Re-Assignment Algorithm;




Alert the Workflow Administrator, so that the Workflow Administrator can
modify the SSOD & DSOD constraints in order to re-execute this algorithm;
go to statement S;
g
g
g while there is another Task in the MR
END
Fig. 10. Overall Algorithm.
and execution model, along with formal work-
flow goal specification will also be necessary
for implementation purposes. Formal specifica-
tion of the SSOD and DSOD constraints, along
lines of Bertino, et.al., 1999, also need to be
incorporated into implementation. We should
also incorporate more control-flow dependen-
cies such as strict-sync and soft-sync into our
workflow model, perhaps leveraging from the
ACTA Chrysanthis and Ramamritham, 1990
transaction model. A semi- automatic algo-
rithm for MR determination can also be devel-
oped and implemented. Using ideas from van
der Aalst, et.al., 2001, we can also look at
efficient and automatic MR determination al-
gorithms specialized for specific workflow pat-
terns.
Our technique can also be extended for work-
flows running in distributed and heterogene-
ous environments Dellarocas and Klein, 1999;
Herzberg, et.al., 2001; Kang, et.al., 2001; Na-
rendra, 2001, managed by intelligent agents.
Also, the European bank case study as reported
in Schaad, et.al., 2001, has brought one possi-
ble interesting extension to the basic RBAC
model used in this paper, viz., defining groups
of users for which roles can be assigned. The
use of a general mechanism such as policy do-
mains Sloman and Twidle, 1994 needs inves-
tigation. Other extensions of the RBAC model,
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such as Team-Based Access Control Geor-
giadis, et.al., 2001 and Set-Based Access Con-
trol van den Akker, et.al., 2001, also need
to be investigated In particular, the applicabil-
ity of TRBAC Bertino and Bonatti, 2001 for
Adaptive Workflow needs to be investigated.
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